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Introduction
You have heard it all before. Capital flows are not all the same (Frankel and Rose,
1996; Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998). Just as with cholesterol, there is the good kind
and the bad kind. The good kind – foreign direct investment (FDI) – brings with it technology,
managerial skills and market access and thus accelerates growth and development (Aitken,
Hanson, and Harrison, 1997; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; Borensztein, De Gregorio, and
Lee, 1998). Furthermore, it is bolted down and cannot leave so easily at the first sign of trouble.
It flows in because it is attracted by the long-term prospects of a country and the confidence
that its policies and institutions inspire. The bad cholesterol is represented by debt, especially of
the short-term variety. It is driven by speculative considerations based on interest rate
differentials and exchange rate expectations, not on long-term considerations. Its movement is
often the result of moral hazard distortions such as implicit exchange rate guarantees or the
willingness of governments to bailout the banking system. It is the first to run for the exits in
times of trouble and is responsible for the boom-bust cycles of the 1990s (Chuhan, Perez-
Quiros, and Popper, 1996; Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi, 1998; Claessens, Dooley, and
Warner, 1995; Dooley, Claessens and Warner, 1995; Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
This analysis casts current Latin American events in a very favorable light: the flow of
capital to Latin America is becoming increasingly dominated by FDI. In fact, while private
capital inflows (i.e. total cholesterol) declined to US$ 68.6 billion in 1999, off 36 percent from a
peak of US$107 billion in 1997 (see Figure 1), FDI￿the good cholesterol￿has been
exploding. In fact, from less than US$ 10 billion in the early 90’s (see Figure 2), and US$ 35.8
billion (36.8 percent of private flows) as recently as 1996, FDI reached US$ 66.5 billion in
1999, just under 97 percent of net private capital inflows in 1999 (see Figure 1).4
How should we interpret the upsurge in FDI? Is it the consequence of a better policy
environment? Is it a sign of confidence in the growth prospects and policies of Latin America?
Should countries try to promote FDI while discouraging other types of flows?
This paper studies the proposition that capital inflows tend to take the form of FDI
￿i.e. the share of FDI in total liabilities tends to be higher￿in countries that are safer, more
promising and with better institutions and policies. It finds that this view is patently wrong since it
stands the historical record on its head. It then uses alternative theories to make sense of the
facts. It begins by studying the determinants of the size and composition of the flows of private
capital across countries. It finds that while capital flows tend to go to countries that are safer and
have better institutions and financial markets, the share of FDI in total flows is not an indication
of good health. On the contrary, countries that are riskier, less financially developed and have
weaker institutions tend to attract less capital but more of it in the form of FDI. Hence,
interpreting the rising share of FDI, as a sign of good health is unwarranted.
1 This is even more
so, given that FDI’s recent rise has taken place while total private capital inflows have fallen.
After establishing the stylized facts we move on to clarify some of the misunderstandings
that emerge from the mere definition of foreign direct investment. In particular, FDI is not the
foreign firm itself but only one of the ways in which it finances itself. We will argue, following
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985), that firms are in themselves substitutes for the market
and will tend to extend their borders wherever they encounter missing or inefficient markets. In
this context, foreign companies dealing with such markets will want to have hierarchical control
(i.e. establish firms), in those environments where transaction costs (i.e. the costs of relying on
the market) are high. Hence, in countries with inefficient financial markets, inadequate contract
enforcement and poor protection of intellectual property, foreign companies will want to operate
directly instead of relying on local suppliers, franchises or other arrangements. Secondly, the
choice between debt, portfolio equity and FDI will reflect those elements that the theory of
corporate finance has pointed out: the higher the risk, the greater the reliance on equity; hence
                                                
1 A companion paper addresses the issue of the relationship between the composition of the capital account
and the risk of crises. It studies among other things the proposition that FDI is better because it is “bolted
down.”5
FDI.
We will conclude with some policy implications. The first is that the share of FDI in total
capital inflows is not a measure of anything good happening in the economy. We will argue that
the fact that the recent rise in the ratio of FDI to total capital inflows started after the Tequila
Crisis and accelerated during the East Asian and Russian crises is no coincidence. It can be
explained by the fact that lower growth prospects and higher risks lead companies to prefer
more equity and less debt in the composition of their capital. Also, poorly functioning debt and
equity markets can make FDI a more efficient way to access capital. In all of these cases, the
fact that the share of FDI in capital inflows is rising is not bad in itself, but is instead an optimal
response to a deteriorating environment. Hence, a high share of FDI in capital inflows is not a
sign of good health, as evidenced by the industrial countries where it is barely 12 percent.
Consequently, policies directed at expanding that share are unwarranted. Instead, countries
should concentrate on improving the environment for investment and the functioning of markets.
They are likely to be rewarded with increasingly efficient overall investment as well as with more
capital inflows. However, under those conditions the share of FDI in those inflows may decline:
that could very well be a sign of good health!
The paper starts by presenting the empirical evidence on the size and composition of
capital inflows (Section 2). In section 3 we run a set of regressions to see how much of the
cross-country experience can be explained by variables such as the quality of institutions, the
level of risk and development, among others. In sections 4 to 6, we review different theoretical
approaches to see how they may help make sense of the empirical findings. We derive our
conclusions in section 7.
Size and Composition of Private Capital Flows: Some Stylized Facts
Does it not make sense to see FDI as a more serious, long-term commitment to a country that is
more demanding in terms of institutions, prospects and policies? Should one not expect FDI to6
be a preferred type of capital? What is wrong with the good cholesterol￿bad cholesterol
metaphor?
To analyze this question we looked at three concepts. First, we considered gross
private capital inflows as a share of GDP, i.e. how large is the stock of liabilities to private
foreign investors relative to GDP. Second, we looked at the share of FDI in those liabilities, i.e.
the share of good cholesterol. Finally, we examined the ratio of FDI to GDP. Obviously, the last
ratio is the product of the first two.
2 We can thus decompose the share of FDI to GDP as a
consequence of a volume effect, reflected in the total flow of private or commercial capital, and
a composition effect, i.e. what proportion of it is FDI or “good cholesterol.” Figure 3 uses the
stocks of liabilities for 1997, while Figure 4 uses the average flows of capital for the period
1996-98.
3 The two sets of graphs are quite similar, indicating that what has been true
historically, as reflected in accumulated stocks, is also true for the recent past.
Figures 3a and 4a show that gross private liabilities as a share of GDP are by far highest
in industrial countries, with flows reaching almost 10 percent of GDP. Then come in close
proximity to each other three middle-income regions: Latin America, East Asia
4, and Eastern
Europe, averaging around 3 percent of GDP. The lowest levels are found in the low-income
regions of Asia and Africa, with flows that are between 1 and 2 percent of GDP.
Figures 3b and 4b show the proportion of private flows that take the form of FDI. Here
the story is reversed. The industrial countries show the lowest share of good cholesterol,
averaging only about 12 percent of total liabilities. In figure 3b we find that the stock of FDI
represents around 30 percent of the total stock of private external liabilities in the three middle
income regions of Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe, while the share is highest in the
poor regions of Asia and Africa, where it exceeds 50 percent. This pattern varies somewhat
from recent experience, as shown in Figure 4b. There, the ratio in Asia has amply surpassed
                                                
2 The relationship is straightforward:
FDI/GDP = (Total Private Capital/GDP)(FDI/Total Private Capital)
3 Data on 1999 was not available for all regions of the world.
4 For the purpose of this paper we define East Asia as Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines
and Singapore.7
that in Africa while the ratio in Latin America has become much higher than that observed in
East Asia and Eastern Europe.
Figure 3c shows the accumulated stock of FDI as a share of GDP. Latin America and
the industrial countries share a similar ratio of slightly over 7 percent of GDP, followed by East
Asia with 6.3 percent. Eastern Europe falls in a much more distant fourth place, with stocks of
FDI as a share of GDP similar to those of Africa, under 4 percent of GDP, while the lowest
ratio is observed in Asia, where it is below 3 percent of GDP.  Figure 4c shows that the recent
experience has been different. Latin America is by far the region with the highest ratio of FDI to
GDP, reaching 1.6 percent of GDP. The industrial countries, East Asia and Eastern Europe
received a similar but much lower proportion of FDI, averaging some 1.2 percent of GDP. Asia
and Africa have both received slightly less than 1 percent of GDP in FDI flows during 1996-98.
Hence, we find that total capital flows tend to increase with the level of development.
However, the share of those flows that take the form of FDI tends to decline with the level of
development. Said differently, FDI seems to be an inferior good in the sense that its share tends
to fall with income. Finally, the share of FDI to GDP is a consequence of these two previous
effects. It is very high in industrial countries because it is a small share of a very large total
volume of capital. It has been unusually high in Latin America recently, not because total flows
have been high, but because the share of those flows that take the form of FDI has been
unusually high both historical speaking and in relation to other middle income regions such as
Eastern Europe and East Asia. Finally, in Africa and Asia the ratio of FDI to GDP is low
because low volumes of total capital are not compensated by very high shares of FDI in the mix.
This is a first piece of evidence that there must be something wrong with the
conventional wisdom. The share of good cholesterol is not highest in the most prosperous
regions, but quite the contrary. What the conventional wisdom attributes to FDI seems to be
true of total capital. It is total capital that appears to go up with economic development while the
share of FDI declines.
The following three sections delve into an empirical investigation of these three
propositions and find them either patently wrong or at least largely unsubstantiated. We then
explore theoretical approaches that can make sense of the historical experience.8
What Determines the Size and Composition of Capital Flows?
What factors are associated with the size and composition of capital flows? What is the role of
the level of development, openness, stability, and financial and institutional development on the
size and composition of capital inflows. What factors are associated with high proportions of
good cholesterol?
To explore this question we compiled a data set described in Annex 1 and used it to run
a set of regressions. These are presented in Tables 1 to 3, which present, respectively,
equations for the total volume of capital as a share of GDP, the composition of FDI in total
capital inflows, and the share of FDI in GDP. The first parts of all tables show the results for the
simple regression using as independent variable only the concept shown. This serves to identify
the overall empirical relationship between the two variables. The second part of the tables
shows the results of each explanatory variable when we control for the level of income per
capita, the size of the economy (total GDP) and the level of openness (the ratio of exports to
GDP). These regressions examine the effect of each variable when we keep the control
variables constant. We present only the regressions for the determinants of the average flows for
1996-98. Similar results are obtained by using the data on stocks shown in Figure 3.
The Effect of the Level of Income
As suggested by Figures 3 and 4, the total volume of capital flows is strongly and
positively related to per capita income. This relationship is quite robust and as shown in the
second part of Table 1 is still significant when we include other determinants such as the overall
size and openness of the economy.
By contrast, the share of capital inflows that takes the form of FDI is strongly
negatively related to income, a relationship that also remains significant when other control
variables are included. The share of FDI in GDP, which is the product of the previous two
ratios, is positively related to income, but the statistical significance of this relationship is
not robust to the inclusion of other control variables.9
We conclude that capital flows tend to increase with the level of development but the
share of FDI tends to decline. The net effect of both factors on the share of FDI in GDP is
ambiguous.
Is Big Better? The Effect of Economic Size
Does capital tend to flow to larger economies? Does a bigger domestic market attract
FDI? Are small countries at a disadvantage?
To explore these issues we use as a measure of size the log of GDP in dollars at current
prices. We find a positive correlation between the total size of capital flows and size, but this
relationship is not robust, and in fact changes sign when we include income per capita. The
implication is that for two economies with similar levels of development, the bigger
economy does not receive larger flows.
The FDI composition of the flows is negatively related to economic size and the
relationship remains negative, although not statistically significant when the other control
variables are included. Hence, there is no evidence that larger countries attract a
proportionally larger share of FDI in total flows. The share of FDI in GDP￿the product
of the two previous ratios￿is negatively and not significantly associated with size.
Hence, there is no evidence that capital favors larger economies.
The Effect of Openness
Is capital attracted to more open economies? Does FDI flow to countries that are more
open? To answer this question we studied the relationship of the share of exports in GDP with
the volume and composition of capital inflows.
We find that the total volume of capital flows is positively and strongly related to
openness. More open economies tend to attract proportionally more foreign capital. However,
the same is not true for the FDI-composition of capital: openness is negatively related with the
share of FDI, although this relationship is not robust to the inclusion of income per capita and10
size. Hence, the share of FDI in capital flows does not increase in economies that are
more open.
The ratio of FDI to GDP is positively and robustly associated with openness, but
we conclude that it is only because of the effect of openness on the total size of capital
inflows and not because it affects the share of FDI in the composition. Openness increases all
forms of cholesterol; it does not skew the composition towards FDI.
5
Does FDI Flow to Safer, More Stable Countries?
Does an environment of economic stability attract FDI? To analyze this question we ran
regressions of the size and composition of capital inflows on the volatility of GDP growth over
the previous decade and on a measure of country risk. We find there is a strongly negative and
statistically significant relationship between country risk and total capital flows. Riskier
countries get less capital. The relationship remains negative but loses significance when we
introduce other controls. There is also a weak negative relationship between volatility and the
volume of capital flows, a relationship that is consistently negative but not statistically significant.
By contrast, there is a positive and statistically significant relation between
country risk and the share of FDI in capital inflows: riskier countries tend to get more of
their flows in the form of FDI. The link between volatility and the FDI composition of flows is
also positive and both remain positive but lose their statistical significance when other controls
are included.
As a consequence of these two factors, there is a positive but not statistically significant
relationship between volatility and the ratio of FDI to GDP. However, there is a negative
relationship between country risk and the share of FDI in GDP. It is significant and
maintains its sign, but does not remain statistically significant when we introduce the control
variables. We conclude that it is not true that capital flows tend to take the form of FDI in
more stable economies. While capital tends to shun volatile environments, its composition
tends to become more FDI-intensive when volatility is greater.
                                                
5 Alternatively, one could interpret the relationship as indicating that countries that attract a larger share of11
The Effect of Natural Resources
Is capital attracted by the opportunity to exploit natural resources? To study this
question we looked at the relationship between our variables of size and composition of capital
flows with the World Bank data on subsoil natural wealth. We find a negative and statistically
not significant relationship between the total volume of capital flows and subsoil wealth.
However, there is a positive, statistically significant and robust relationship between subsoil
wealth and the share of FDI in capital flows. As a consequence, the share of FDI in GDP is
associated with subsoil wealth in a positive but not statistically significant manner. We conclude
that natural resources are no magnet for capital, but they tend to strongly shift the
composition in favor of FDI.
Does Distance Matter?
Is being far away a problem? To study this question we looked at the distance of a country to
major world markets. We find that distance is negatively and significantly related to total capital
flows, although the relationship keeps its sign but loses its statistical significance when other
control variables are introduced.
6 However, the share of FDI in capital inflows is positively
affected by distance in a statistically significant and relatively robust manner. As a consequence,
the ratio of FDI to GDP seems to go up with distance.
We conclude that proximity may be good for total capital flows, but it does not favor
good cholesterol. The share of FDI goes up with distance.
Does Financial Development Matter?
Greater financial development as measured by the share of private credit to GDP is positively
                                                                                                                                                
FDI in total flows do not export more.
6 Sachs and Warner (1995) and IDB (2000) find that the level of development is negatively and strongly
affected by distance.12
related to capital flows but negatively related to the share of FDI in those flows. The relationship
maintains its sign but is significantly weakened by the introduction of other control variables,
especially income per capita. The net effect of these two factors on the share of FDI in GDP is
positive and strong, but not statistically significant when other controls are included in the
regression.
We conclude that financial development is positively associated with the volume of
capital, but does not shift its composition in favor of FDI.
Does Institutional Quality Matter?
Is FDI attracted by the quality of a country’s institutions? To analyze this question we used two
sets of internationally comparable indexes of institutional quality. First, we used Dani Kaufman’s
6 indexes of government quality (regulatory burden, accountability, government effectiveness,
graft, rule of law). We also constructed a single overall index of government quality as the
principal component of the 6 individual measures. Second, we used the La Porta et al. (1997,
1998a, 1998b) indexes of creditor rights and shareholder rights.
We find that Kaufman’s indexes of institutional quality are positively and strongly
correlated with the total volume of capital flows.  This relationship remains positive but not
statistically significant after the inclusion of the control variables, especially income per capita.
The only index that remains significant is the measure of regulatory burden. IDB (2000) finds
that Kaufmann’s indexes are strongly correlated with measures of the level of development such
as income per capita. Hence, one interpretation of the results is that institutions matter through
their effect on the level of development, but not directly. If a country at a given level of
development improved its institutions it would not get much more capital. The La Porta et al.
index of creditor rights does not show any consistent relationship with the volume of capital
flows, but the index of shareholder rights does have a positive and quite robust relationship with
the overall volume of capital flows.
By contrast, the FDI share in capital flows is strongly and negatively associated13
with Kaufman’s measures of institutional development and with La Porta’s measure of
shareholders’ rights. After the inclusion of the control variables, this relationship remains
negative for 6 of the 9 indexes, but not in a statistically significant manner.
As a consequence of these two effects, the share of FDI in GDP is positively associated
with institutional development as shown by the positive and statistically significant relationship in
7 out of the 9 indexes used. The relation remains positive for 7 of the 9 indexes and statistically
significant for 5 indexes, especially regulatory burden, government effectiveness and shareholder
rights.
We conclude that institutions positively affect the volume of capital flows but do
not skew the composition in favor of FDI. Countries with better institutions do get more FDI,
but they also get more of other kinds of capital.
Some Preliminary Conclusions
Capital flows tend to go to countries that are more developed, more open, more stable,
financially more advanced and with better institutions. However, these factors tend to reduce the
share of FDI in capital flows. Hence, a larger share of FDI in capital flows is typical of countries
that are poorer, more closed, riskier, more volatile, more distant, less financially developed, with
weaker institutions and with more natural resources.
How can we account for these stylized facts? What is the logic behind these findings?
The next three sections explore potential explanations.
What is FDI? Some Accounting Gimmicks
Much of the confusion about FDI emerges from misunderstandings about what is measured as
FDI. FDI is defined as the increase in the equity position of a non-resident owner who holds14
more than 10 percent of the shares of the firm. It also includes the loans received by the local
company from the parent foreign owner.
7
A firm is a set of assets that are “owned” (i.e. financed) by creditors and shareholders,
where the former have a senior claim over the resources and revenues of the firm and the equity
owners hold the residual claims and have greater influence over management. FDI is not the firm
and its assets. Instead, it is just one of the sources of financing for the firm.  This distinction is
important because many of the benefits attributed to FDI are really generated by the firm, not by
the way it finances itself. For example, if a foreign-owned company brings in new technology, a
better management system or access to new export markets, it is the firm that brings it, not FDI.
FDI is just one way in which such a firm finances itself. If the firm decides to finance itself mainly
by borrowing domestically, all the above mentioned improvements would take place, but it
would not be registered as FDI. If by borrowing domestically it generates incentives for banks
to borrow internationally in order to supply the increased demand for credit, then the firm would
have caused an increase in external borrowing by banks, not FDI.
If the foreign owner buys out the equity position of a domestic owner, that is considered
FDI, even though there are no new machines in the country, just a change of ownership. If the
old owner buys an internationally diversified portfolio with the money he received from the sale
of the company then what came in as FDI leaves as other forms of capital outflow and is not
available to pay for any new imports. This is one way in which FDI is not bolted down.
Also, if the foreign owner does a leveraged buyout by borrowing domestically, the loan
would be registered as an outflow of capital (a loan to a foreign agent by a domestic bank),
while the buyout would be registered as FDI. In this case, FDI is not financing the current
account. It is just the “return” of money that only figuratively went out.
8
Consider a healthy company with good growth prospects that normally reinvests all its
profits and borrows abroad to fund part of its expansion plans. Suddenly, a foreign company
acquires the domestic firm, maybe because the old owner wants to retire. After the purchase,
                                                
7 In fact, about 20 percent of FDI flows take the form of loans from the parent company. The motivation for
and implications of this fact will be discussed below.
8 The same would happen to the accounting of a domestic bank loan to a foreign owned firm that is15
the company is run just the same, with the same reinvestment policy and the same borrowing
plan. This operation will lead to a sudden jump in FDI in the year of the acquisition. After that,
the current account deficit of the country will increase by an amount equivalent to the accrued
profits of the firm. But since these are reinvested it would be registered as an equivalent inflow
of FDI every year. Hence, there would be a long run increase in FDI, but not an increase in the
real investment of the economy, only a change in ownership.
To make sense of FDI it is important to understand that there is no agent called FDI.
FDI is just an account. A firm has many accounts: it has equity, domestic and foreign assets and
debts, which can also be either short or long-term. It is the firm that makes decisions, not the
accounts. FDI is not bolted down, machines are. If a foreigner buys a machine and gives it as a
capital contribution (FDI) to a local company, the machine may be bolted down. But the
company’s treasurer can use the machine as collateral to get a local bank loan and take money
out of the country. Hence, a firm may be doing one thing with its assets and something quite
different with the way it finances them. Money may be coming in through one account and
leaving through another. This means that checking whether FDI is more or less stable than other
flows of capital does not help determine whether it makes the overall capital account more
stable. The foreign company’s treasurer may be hedging the firm’s FDI exposure by borrowing
domestically and taking out short-term capital.
This discussion helps explain why a significant part of FDI is documented as a loan from
the parent company.
9 Part of the answer has to do with tax considerations, since interest and
dividends are often not treated the same by the tax code. But also, dividends and stock
repurchases are awkward ways to hedge risks. They are typically decisions of the shareholders
or at least of the executive board and require the presentation of the company’s financial results,
something that happens at most quarterly. Profits have to be assessed by outside auditors and
they involve tax liabilities. Therefore, dividends cannot be determined overnight. By contrast, the
treasurer can use his liquid assets or take a local loan and repay the parent company much more
                                                                                                                                                
incorporated abroad instead of through a local subsidiary.
9 It makes sense to treat the loan as an equity investment because it is in principle junior to all other debt
obligations of the firm.16
swiftly. So documenting FDI as a loan from the parent company makes it much easier to take
out at short notice, in case of trouble: another way in which it is not bolted down.
Hence, we need a theory of how a firm makes its decisions in order to interpret changes
in its “capital account” and in the way the balance of payments moves. To develop such a
theory we will begin by extracting some implications of the new theories of the firm and then
move on to issues of finance.
The Firm as a Substitute for the Market
FDI involves ownership that provides significant control over a firm. A firm is a hierarchical
organization, whose existence was pretty much disregarded by neo-classical theory. Why is
production organized through firms and what determines their structure? With perfect and
complete markets, there are few reasons for factors to meet in a large organization. Workers
and capital can just go every day to the market and allocate themselves. A theory of the firm
would have to explain why we observe these hierarchical structures we call firms that deal with
the market only at their borders: when they buy or sell, not when they produce. ‘Make or buy’
is a question that every firm must face when deciding where to put its borders. Should an
apparel company make its own cloth or buy it from another firm? Should it dye, stamp or wash
it? Should it make its own yarn? Should it make its own packaging? Should it sell to wholesalers
and retailers or own and operate the distribution channels it uses? Should it instead have
franchises? Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) provide an answer to this puzzle. They argue
that markets are not perfect and generate transaction costs. Hierarchies are not perfect either
and also generate internal transaction or organizational costs. Firms compare the transaction
costs of relying on the market with the production and bureaucratic costs of doing things
internally. Are suppliers reliable? Do they have monopoly power? Is the internal organization a
mess that cannot hold yet another activity? Are there any synergies of having several activities
under the same roof?
So why would a foreign firm want to extend its borders internationally through FDI,
instead of just relying on the market? In general, given organizational and management costs, the17
more inefficient the market, the greater the incentive to extend the border of the firm.
The firm will try to internalize all the functions that are poorly carried out by the market. Hence,
the firm can be thought of as a substitute for the market. We should not then be surprised to find
that when the institutional environment is poor, or when certain markets are not adequately
developed, foreign firms may find that in order to do business in another market they need to
own and operate a firm, they cannot rely on the market.
This would explain why the total volume of capital flows is positively affected by the
quality of a country’s institutions and growth prospects, but the share that takes the form of FDI
declines with better institutions. The intuition is that the share of FDI needs to be greater in
countries with bad institutions because firms will need to substitute for missing markets.
Poor Protection of Intellectual Property
One such example is technology. Enforcing ownership on ideas is extremely difficult. If it were
not, firms could simply market their know-how and not have to move into new countries or
areas. In the absence of such intellectual property rights protection (IPR), firms may be put in a
situation where the only way to profit from their know-how is by expanding towards new
markets and countries. In this sense, FDI may be prompted by inadequate property rights
protection. You would not give a franchise if you thought that the franchisee would steal your
know-how and establish himself independently. You would not even trust a local partner not to
set up his own shop once he gets the hang of the business.
The conclusion is that the worse the protection of property rights in general, or IPR in
particular, the more likely firms will have to own and operate their own facilities in a market in
order, for example, to exploit their know-how. To do so, they would have to put in some FDI
and then finance with debt the rest of their operations. Hence, while the poor quality of the
institutions of capitalism may make overall investments and capital inflows smaller, it will force
more flows to take the form of FDI.18
Financial Markets
Finance is another tricky sector. It suffers from time inconsistency because, while a borrower
may find it in his benefit to commit to repay in order to get a loan, he may have incentives to
keep the money after receiving it. Not knowing what the borrower might do, the lender would
be reticent to extend loans or would do so only at higher interest rates. But this could be self-
defeating since a higher spread would diminish further the incentives or the ability to pay. To
assure the lender of his commitment to repay, the borrower may give as collateral his ownership
of some asset. If he fails to repay, the lender is contractually authorized to seize the collateral.
This is just one example of how contract enforcement is critical to sustain financial markets. In
its absence, a foreign firm may find it advantageous to borrow abroad and transfer the resources
to its local company. Hence, FDI can be a way to substitute for missing or inefficient debt
markets.
Financial markets also suffer from asymmetric information, which leads to moral hazard.
Typically, the firm knows more than (both debt and equity) investors about the nature of the
project it plans to embark upon. The firm could inform investors, but it has incentives to
misrepresent the truth. The borrower may be truthful, but how is the lender to know? That is
why we typically observe more markets for debt than for equity. To lend you just need to
believe that you can seize the collateral in case the borrower does not pay. You do not need to
know much about the project itself. If instead you are a minority shareholder, you need to know
everything about the business, plus you must monitor the manager or the board to make sure
they do not pocket your money through the many channels at their disposal.
Under these conditions the question is whether you should “make” your own finance or
“buy” it in the market? This is the logic that leads to the conglomerate and the multi-divisional
firm: given that they are under the same management structure, problems of asymmetric
information can be better addressed and capital allocated internally in a more efficient manner.
Suppose there is a firm in a market where the financial system is lousy and access to
international finance is limited, not because there is any problem with the company, but instead
because the country has a low credit rating given the high stock of government debt. As they19
often argue, these companies see themselves as “the right firm with the wrong address.” Imagine
two potential owners: a local entrepreneur and a foreign company. They both value the
company at what they perceive to be the net present value of the future cash flow. The local
owner internalizes the fact that at different moments in the future he will miss profitable
opportunities because access to finance will be restricted or very expensive. These restrictions
will be reflected in lower growth projections and/or a high discount rate. By contrast, if the
foreign owner does not need to rely on the inefficient domestic market or on the volatile
international market for emerging-country debt, he may feel that financial market conditions will
not restrict the growth prospects of the firm. He will reflect this by projecting a higher growth of
revenues or a lower discount rate when valuing the firm. Under these conditions, it makes sense
to expect local capital constrained owners to sell (at a price above their reservation price) to
foreign companies with better access to capital (at a price below their reservation price).
Is this what is driving the new spate of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the region?
Why were the local owners of YPF or Enersis willing to sell to Repsol or Endesa-Spain? What
allowed the foreign company to offer a price above the reservation price of the local owners?
Was it their superior technology or was it their less constrained financial access?
In this sense, the surge in FDI can be generated by the market’s attempt to find
alternatives to poor financial markets for both debt and equity. By making the finance of YPF
internal to Repsol and by tapping capital from a different capital-city and with a different balance
sheet, the allocation of capital becomes an internal decision of the firm circumventing both the
international emerging bond market and the local financial market of Argentina. Repsol-YPF is
not funding itself with more equity, but its subsidiary in Argentina may look that way. By the
same token, foreign investment may take an increasing role in Mexico given that local firms have
not had much access to domestic bank credit. In these cases, FDI is good because it helps
overcome poorly functioning financial markets but is not necessarily a sign of an improving
domestic environment.
The Logic of Mergers and Acquisitions20
This leads us naturally to understanding the nature of mergers and acquisitions (see Krugman
1998). Why do mergers and acquisitions take place? Why are some current owners willing to
sell to some potential new owners? The theory of asset pricing gives us some ideas. The price of
a share is supposed to equal the net present value of future cash flows. If the cash flows seen by
two potential owners are the same or if the rate at which they discount those flows is the same,
they will value the asset at the same price and there would be little point in trading them. Hence,
if we observe a consistent movement in ownership from one set of owners to another it must be
driven by some difference either in the cash flows or in the discount rate. Said differently,
owners will sell if they are offered a price above the net present value of the flows they would
obtain if they kept the ownership of the company. Hence, in principle, ownership changes hands
when the new owners feel they can extract a larger net present value than the current owners
can. What can drive this wedge between the two reservation prices?
Obviously, superior technology, management systems or market access will make one
owner capable of extracting more value out of a firm than its current owner extracts. This is
straightforward and involves the usual attributes associated with FDI. Notice however, that
many of the elements that could make FDI superior are not externalities. They can be perfectly
appropriated by the firm, or partially captured by the previous owners through a sales price
above their reservation price.
In more general terms, the fact that international firms have access to better foreign
institutions and markets may be a source of value that can be extracted by purchasing firms in
the local market and arbitrage between the markets through the firm. This would be a rationale
for some of the mergers and acquisitions taking place in the region. It would also explain why
the share of FDI tends to be higher in countries with weaker institutions.
Corporate Finance and the Capital Mix
In analyzing the choice of capital structure, consider the following proposition. Assume a certain
volume of capital inflows. Would a larger share of FDI in total flows not be safer? This is
obviously the view that a bondholder or a credit rating agency would take. Thus, in its recent21
upgrading of Mexico’s debt, Moody’s used as an argument the fact that the current account
was being financed mostly by FDI. Equity owners have claims on the cash flow of an entity that
are junior to those of creditors. The larger the share of equity, other things being equal, the less
likely it is that the bond will be defaulted on. Hence, as the share of equity increases, other
things being equal, the less risky the bonds. Hence, it makes sense for bondholders to see as
good news the increasing share of FDI in total capital flows. It means their claims are becoming
relatively more senior. By the same token, seen from the point of view of the country, the larger
the equity share, the greater the risk that is shared with foreign investors.
But other things are not equal and this form of partial equilibrium thinking can be
misleading. As the share of equity expands, the debt becomes increasingly safer, and the
company will be able to issue it at lower spreads. Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that
under relatively general conditions, the firm would be completely indifferent to its capital
structure. The intuition is simple. If a firm has a certain risky stream of cash flow and it divides
the rights to it in different forms (say between stocks and bonds), each piece will be priced
according to its risk and return characteristics. There is no way to add value to the firm by just
adjusting who gets what under which conditions. The total value of the firm is just the net
present value of its cash flow, no matter how you split it. By choosing a larger share of equity,
more of the revenue and more of the risk will go to equity holders, but that does not change the
overall value of the firm. This result breaks down when considerations are introduced such as
taxes, costly bankruptcy, problems of asymmetric information and other issues, which will be
addressed below.
The relevance of this to our discussion is that we can imagine a country as composed of
a representative firm and things that affect the optimal capital structure of the firm will affect the
composition of its stock of debt and equity. The flows in the capital account of the balance of
payments can be interpreted as being driven by two factors: first, by changes in the desired
stocks of debt and equity, and secondly, by its distribution between residents and foreigners.
Let us abstract about the second issue and concentrate on the changes to the overall demand of
stocks and bonds.22
The Modigliani and Miller theorem is often stated to mean that corporate finance does
not matter. In our context it would imply that the composition of the capital account does not
affect the net worth of a country: national welfare cannot be affected by changing the
composition of the different assets and liabilities of the country at market prices. The
composition of international finance does not matter.
Obviously, this is not the case in the real world, but as with many other theoretical
results in economics, it raises questions about what aspects of the world might make
international finance matter and what effects they might have.
What Makes Finance Relevant?
In this section we use the Modigliani and Miller theorem to consider the factors that affect the
composition of the supply of stocks and bonds, abstracting from the elements that create a
difference between foreign and domestic investors. We start with tax considerations and then
proceed to other issues.
Tax Considerations
One thing that may affect the choice of capital structure is the nature of the tax system. Imagine
that interest on bonds is not taxed while income on profits is taxed. This means that by changing
the capital structure of the firm you can affect the overall tax burden and hence change the value
of the firm that accrues to bond and stock holders.  In particular, having maximum debt would
lower the tax burden and hence maximize the value of the firm that can be split between
stockholder and bondholders. If by contrast, dividends are not taxed while interest is, then it will
be optimal to have maximum equity. Normally, it is assumed that because of double taxation of
profits (as corporate profits and as personal dividend income), the tax system typically favors
debt finance.23
This point may be an additional element in explaining why so much of FDI is
documented as a loan from the parent company: it can be a way to minimize the tax burden.
10
Since we measure FDI to include loans from the parent company and since such loans are
better ways of dodging the taxman than trading stocks and bonds at market prices, this process
may be happening within the flows that are normally measured as FDI.
One tax element that has implications for the balance of payments is tariffs and other
trade barriers. In principle, other things being equal, they generate an incentive to locate
economic activity domestically in order to avoid the tariff. Obviously, it will affect the efficiency
of the rest of the economy including the export sector, so the net effect of higher tariffs on output
and investment is usually assumed to be negative. Depending on the advantages of foreign
ownership in the export or the import-competing sectors it may have ambiguous effects on FDI.
 We will not focus much on tax issues in the remainder of this paper. However, the
intuition that emerges from this analysis is useful to the study of other considerations. For
example, if there are distortions in the markets for debt or equity, these can be assimilated to a
tax on those sources of finance and hence lead to a reallocation of the optimal portfolio. Thus,
for example, if the debt market is characterized by periods of illiquidity and credit crunches, it is
as if a stochastic tax rate had been applied to it, which would lead to a shift of the optimal
portfolio away from debt finance. In this sense, if the domestic and foreign debt markets
became less efficient after the East Asian and Russian crises, the implicit tax that this
imperfection represents must have gone up, causing the optimal portfolio to shift away from
debt.
Financial Distress and Costly Bankruptcy
The Modigliani and Miller theorem assumes that in case the firm is unable to pay its bondholders
it just does not and the future cash flow of the firm is otherwise unaffected. However,
bankruptcies tend to be quite disruptive. They tend to paralyze the firm, cause a problem of
                                                
10 It may also be a way to make sure that in case of capital controls, the firm will have the right to buy foreign24
debt overhang, generate uncertainty over property rights, curtail access to additional finance and
prevent the company from operating efficiently.
Hence, one reason to choose a particular capital structure is in order to affect the
contingent costs associated with financial distress. Debt can be understood as a riskless bond
plus a “put” option on the cash flow of the firm: if revenues fall below some level, the firm has
the option not to pay the bondholders. A bankruptcy is a situation when the put is “in the
money.” One way of thinking about the factors that affect the contingent cost of bankruptcy is
by considering the factors that go into the value of the put.
First, obviously is the amount of debt relative to equity, i.e. the structure of its capital.
The larger the debt component, the more “in the money” is the put and hence the larger the risk
of bankruptcy. Hence, the optimal structure of capital will be moving over time and across firms
as they attempt to optimize the contingent cost of bankruptcy relative to other factors.
Secondly, higher expectations of growth in future cash flows lead to a lowering of the
probability of default and hence lead to a shift in favor of more debt. By the same token, a
reduction in the level of risk of the cash flow also leads to more debt.
Costly bankruptcy can explain why the share of FDI is higher in countries that are riskier, and
have more volatile output. It can also account for the recent increase in the share of FDI in the
composition of capital flows to Latin America. The 1998-99 decline in the total volume of
capital flows and its shift towards more FDI is consistent with an increase in the perception of
risk of the region. It is not a sign of health. By the same token, the radical economic reforms of
the early 90s brought with them a rapid rise in total capital flows and a fall in the share of FDI,
consistent with the perception of higher growth prospects and lower risks. With the Tequila
Crisis in 1995, growth prospects and the perception of risk reversed course and so did the
share of FDI, a trend that accelerated with the Asian and Russian crises. Hence, without
pretending to have proven anything, this theoretical framework gives a less rosy interpretation of
the trends towards a rising share of FDI: a worsening balance between growth prospects and
risks!
                                                                                                                                                
exchange to service its “external debt.”25
Costly bankruptcy can also explain why countries with a large stock of subsoil
resources have a larger share of FDI. Mining and oil are sectors characterized by very volatile
prices, high capital intensity and very specific assets (i.e. assets that cannot be sold off to
another activity in case of financial distress). Therefore, those sectors tend to have a much larger
equity composition in their capital mix, and hence a larger share of FDI.
Incomplete Markets and Original Sin
Another dimension of the financial problem is the presence of incomplete markets. Ideally, a
firm should be able to borrow short and long term in any currency in order to match the maturity
structure of its assets and the currency denomination of its cash flow. If the firm does not find
the adequate financial instruments it will have a riskier balance sheet. In particular, if it does not
find enough long-term financing to match its assets, it will have to borrow short term and have a
maturity mismatch. If it does not find enough financing in the currency denomination of its cash
flow, it will have a currency mismatch. These mismatches will make the firm riskier and hence
require more equity in its optimal financial mix. From this point of view, since equity is
intrinsically very long run, it does not generate maturity mismatch problems. Moreover, since it
does not have a currency denomination￿ i.e. it is just a residual claim over a portion of the
firm’s cash flow, whatever currency it may be in￿it does not generate currency mismatches.
The typical Latin American entity (firm or government) is unable to borrow abroad in
pesos and is unable to borrow long term in pesos, even domestically. Hence it must choose
between borrowing short-term domestically, thus generating a maturity mismatch, or
alternatively borrow longer term in dollars but then be saddled with a currency mismatch.
This phenomenon has been termed the devil’s choice by Pedro Pou and the original
sin by others (see Hausmann 1999; Eichengreen and Hausmann; 2000, Hausmann, Stein and
Panizza; 2000). Figure 5 shows the proportion of international securities issued in a country’s
currency relative to the amount issued by that country’s residents. Countries such as the United
States and Switzerland appear with ratios greater than 1 because many non-residents issue in
US dollars or Swiss francs. Countries that do not appear in the graph simply have no26
international issues in their own currency. Essentially, all of Latin America and East Asia have
either zero or insignificant issues in their own currency.
Following this logic, original sin should lead to smaller overall capital flows and to a
larger share of those flows taking the form of FDI. We use as a metric for original sin the
variable presented in Figure 5. Hence, a larger value of the index represents a greater ability to
borrow in that country’s currency. We find in Tables 1, 2 and 3 that the total volume of
capital flows is larger in countries that can borrow in their own currency, while the
composition of capital inflows is less intensive in FDI in those countries. These two effects
act in opposite directions and hence there is no significant relationship between this variable and
the ratio of FDI to GDP.
Conclusions and policy implications
Capital inflows into Latin America slowed down in 1998-99 but the share of FDI increased
very significantly to the point that it now represents over 60 percent of gross flows. Is this good?
Is this an indication that things are getting better? Is this a consequence of a general
improvement in the perception of growth prospects, stability and institutional development?
This paper revealed that the share of FDI in total flows tends to be larger in countries
that are riskier, more distant, resource rich, financially underdeveloped, institutionally weak and
suffering from original sin. Hence, it is hard to argue that the rise in the share of FDI is an
indication of good health.
However, this does not mean that the rise in FDI is bad in itself. On the contrary,
movements in the size and composition of the capital account may reflect behavior that is
optimal given the constraints faced by agents. If the risks of operating in Latin America are
generating an increase in the optimal share of equity in the capital structure of firms and if M&A
is the form it is taking, then it is a movement in the right direction. If the deterioration in the
functioning of debt markets is answered by arbitraging between markets through foreign-owned
firms, then that is an improvement over the alternatives. If in the absence of adequate institutional
development and property rights protection, investment takes the form of FDI, then it is better27
that it occur this way rather than not at all. If original sin discourages international lending
because it cannot be denominated in local currency, then it is better that it take place as FDI
than not at all.
Hence, there is no reason to say that the rise in FDI is not the best thing that could have
happened, given the prevailing conditions. However, this does not mean that the rise in FDI is a
sign of good health, or that we can rank the quality of a country’s institutions, its risks and its
prospects according to the share of good cholesterol in total cholesterol. We can argue even
less that policies should be adopted to promote FDI and to discourage other types of capital
flows. On the contrary, the rise of FDI is an indication that markets are working poorly, that
institutions are inadequate and that risks are high. Residents are selling their companies because
they do not have the markets and institutions that allow them to grow.
Latin America needs reforms in order to improve the institutional framework that
supports investment, finance and risk-taking. It needs to generate a reduction in overall risk by
making markets more efficient and complete. This will promote investment, productivity and
growth. However, this may well shift the optimal composition towards more debt and less FDI.
In that case, a declining share of FDI in the context of rising overall flows may be a sign of good
health.28
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FIGURE 1. Recent Behavior of Net Commercial Capital Flows  in Latin America
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FIGURE 2. Evolution and Composition of FDI Flows in Latin America
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Source: IFS, WB and RES-IDB.34
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Recent Flows (96-98)
* Weighted average of countries and simple average of years.  The data refers to liability commercial flows in current dollars and GDP in
current PPP dollars. The GDP per capita is a weighted average of countries for 1997.
Source: IFS, WEO and RES-IDB.37








































2.5  3.0  3.5  4.0  4.5 







Recent Capital Flows (96-98)
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FIGURE 5. Original Sin: World Comparison
Debt in Currency X Over Debt in Country X, 1998 (Money Market Instruments and Bonds)





































Coefficient t-statistic R-squared N. Obs. Coefficient t-statistic R-squared N. Obs.
Controls
Income 0.62 8.84 0.57 59 0.52 4.31 0.64 57
Size 0.15 1.82 0.05 59 -0.06 -0.82 0.64 57
Openness 0.92 6.83 0.45 57 0.38 2.29 0.64 57
Stability Indicators
Country Risk -0.02 -5.80 0.36 59 0.00 -0.86 0.61 57
GDP volatility (past) -3.67 -1.06 0.01 58 -1.92 -0.81 0.66 56
Natural Resources
Subsoil Resources -0.38 -1.30 0.04 42 -0.16 -0.98 0.74 42
Distance -0.20 -3.19 0.21 40 -0.04 -0.78 0.70 40
Financial Development
Private Credit 1.94 4.71 0.30 55 0.58 1.39 0.67 53
Quality of Institutions
Regulatory Burden 1.34 6.18 0.40 59 0.53 2.19 0.67 57
Accountability 0.81 6.43 0.42 59 0.07 0.38 0.64 57
Government Effectiveness 0.87 7.33 0.48 59 0.14 0.65 0.64 57
Political Instability 0.94 6.48 0.42 59 0.08 0.45 0.64 57
Graft 0.79 7.07 0.47 59 0.05 0.26 0.64 57
Rule of Law 0.83 6.95 0.45 59 0.09 0.48 0.64 57
Principal Component 0.39 8.02 0.53 59 0.09 0.92 0.65 57
Institutions Credit 0.01 0.11 0.00 34 -0.03 -0.37 0.70 34
Institutions Share 0.20 1.54 0.07 35 0.17 2.16 0.72 35
Original Sin 2.41 3.06 0.16 51 0.55 0.80 0.72 49
Notes: 
See Annex for an explanation of each variable and of the sample used.
Without Controls With Controls
Determinants of Total Commercial Capital Flows/GDP ( Average 1996-98)41
TABLE 2
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient t-statistic R-squared N. Obs. Coefficient t-statistic R-squared N. Obs.
Controls
Income -0.083 -4.37 0.25 60 -0.068 -1.96 0.26 57
Size -0.044 -2.88 0.13 60 -0.019 -0.93 0.26 57
Openness -0.076 -2.13 0.08 57 0.000 0.00 0.26 57
Stability Indicators
Country Risk 0.003 3.58 0.18 59 0.000 0.20 0.28 56
GDP volatility (past) 1.126 1.66 0.04 62 0.458 0.65 0.27 56
Natural Resources
Subsoil Resources 0.180 3.78 0.26 42 0.151 3.65 0.50 42
Distance 0.030 2.22 0.11 40 0.022 1.56 0.34 40
Financial Development
Private Credit -0.236 -2.77 0.12 56 -0.075 -0.62 0.24 53
Quality of Institutions
Regulatory Burden -0.092 -1.70 0.05 59 0.064 0.87 0.27 57
Accountability -0.106 -3.54 0.18 60 -0.050 -0.95 0.28 57
Government Effectiveness -0.102 -3.37 0.16 60 0.011 0.18 0.26 57
Political Instability -0.095 -2.66 0.11 60 -0.002 -0.04 0.26 57
Graft -0.091 -3.21 0.15 59 0.015 0.26 0.26 57
Rule of Law -0.109 -3.78 0.20 60 -0.044 -0.79 0.27 57
Principal Component -0.044 -3.44 0.17 59 -0.004 -0.14 0.26 57
Institutions Credit -0.018 -0.80 0.02 34 -0.016 -0.71 0.16 34
Institutions Share -0.043 -1.59 0.07 35 -0.033 -1.20 0.19 35
Original Sin -0.511 -2.81 0.14 51 -0.093 -0.36 0.27 49
Notes: 
See Annex for an explanation of each variable and of the sample used.
Without Controls With Controls
Determinants of FDI/Total Commercial Capital Flows ( Average 1996-98)42
TABLE 3
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient t-statistic R-squared N. Obs. Coefficient t-statistic R-squared N. Obs.
Controls
Income 0.006 3.63 0.18 64 0.002 1.07 0.40 61
Size -0.001 -0.98 0.02 64 -0.001 -1.10 0.40 61
Openness 0.012 6.10 0.39 61 0.010 3.21 0.40 61
Stability Indicators
Country Risk -0.00016 -3.01 0.11 64 0.000 -0.65 0.40 61
GDP volatility (past) 0.015 0.27 0.00 63 0.021 0.46 0.42 60
Natural Resources
Subsoil Resources 0.001 0.36 0.00 43 0.003 0.93 0.43 43
Distance -0.00049 -0.45 0.01 42 0.002 2.07 0.58 42
Financial Development
Private Credit 0.019 2.72 0.11 60 0.008 0.97 0.43 57
Quality of Institutions
Regulatory Burden 0.017 4.34 0.23 64 0.013 3.01 0.49 61
Accountability 0.003 1.06 0.01 64 -0.004 -1.42 0.42 61
Government Effectiveness 0.010 4.07 0.21 64 0.010 2.56 0.46 61
Political Instability 0.009 3.15 0.14 64 0.002 0.54 0.40 61
Graft 0.008 3.55 0.17 64 0.006 1.62 0.43 61
Rule of Law 0.009 3.69 0.18 64 0.004 1.01 0.41 61
Principal Component 0.004 3.62 0.17 64 0.003 1.50 0.42 61
Institutions Credit 0.001 0.24 0.00 37 -0.001 -0.34 0.51 37
Institutions Share 0.005 2.13 0.11 38 0.004 2.62 0.59 38
Original Sin 0.007 0.46 0.00 56 0.008 0.48 0.43 53
Notes: 
See Annex for an explanation of each variable and of the sample used.
Without Controls With Controls
Determinants of FDI/GDP ( Average Flows 1996-98)43
Annex
I.  The Sample
 All the countries for which information is available excluding the ones with a GDP in current
dollars in 1997 smaller than 5 billion, Panama and Switzerland.




The transformation used is:
Log (Total Commercial K
Flows/GDP)
Total Commercial K flows =
FDI flows liabilities + Portfolio
flows liabilities + Other
Investments flows liabilities. (all
the above in current dollars).
Simple Average for 1996-1998.
GDP in PPP current dollars.
Simple Average for 1996-1998
IFS and World Bank
FDI Flows/ Total Commercial
K Flows
The transformation  used is
Log((FDI Flows/ Total
Commercial K Flows)+1)
FDI Flows Liabilities in current
dollars. Simple Average for
1996-1998.
Total Commercial K flows =
FDI flows liabilities + Portfolio
flows liabilities + Other
Investments flows liabilities. (all
the above in current dollars).
Simple Average for 1996-1998.
IFS and World Bank
FDI Flows/GDP
The transformation  used is
Log((FDI Flows/GDP)+1)
FDI Flows Liabilities in current
dollars. Simple Average for
1996-1998.
GDP in PPP current dollars.
Simple Average for 1996-1998
IFS and World Bank
* We excluded the countries for which the average of Total Commercial K flows < 0 (2 countries)
and those for which FDI/Total Commercial K flows>3 (2 also).44
III.  The Explanatory variables
Variable Description Sources
Income Log(GDP per capita in current
dollars)
WEO
Size Log(GDP in current dollars) WEO
Openness Log (Exports/GDP) IFS, WEO
Country Risk The indicator ranks the
countries of the world
depending on the perception of
risk. The higher the riskier.
Institutional Investor
GDP volatility (past) Standard Deviation of the
growth rate of the GDP in
constant local currency during
the 90’s.
WEO
Subsoil Resources Dollar value of the subsoil
resources of the country.
Distance Distance to main markets. Barro and Lee (World Bank)
Private Credit Private Credit/GDP IFS
Quality of Institutions indexes -
Kaufmann
Aggregate indexes of different
measures related to six basic
governance concepts. The
indexes are higher in the
countries of better government
performance.
Kaufmann et al.
- Regulatory Burden Incidence of market-unfriendly
policies and perception of the
burdens imposed by excessive
regulation
Kaufmann et al.
- Accountability Measures the extent to which
citizens of a country are able to
participate in the selection of
governments.
Kaufmann et al.
- Government Effectiveness Combine perceptions of the
quality of public service
provision, the quality of the
bureaucracy and the
competence of civil servants.
Kaufmann et al.
- Political Instability and
Violence
Measure perceptions of the
likelihood that the government
in the power will be
Kaufmann et al.45
destabilized or overthrown by
possibly unconstitutional
and/or violent means
- Graft Measures perceptions of
corruption.
Kaufmann et al.
- Rule of Law Measure the extent to which
agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society.
Kaufmann et al.
- Principal component of the
last six indicators.
A measure that tries to
combine all the aspects
described by the six indicators.
Kaufmann et al.




Institutions Share Indicator of the legal rules
covering protection of the
corporate shareholders.
Lopez-de-Silanes et al.
Original Sin Percentage of total external
debt of a country that is issued
in its own currency.
BIS, RES-IDB
IV.  The Models
Two specifications were used to study the determinants of the volume and composition
of recent capital flows. The models were estimated using cross section data and Ordinary Least
Squares.
In the first one the dependent variables are regressed against each of the independent
variables alone and a constant.  It explores the raw relation between both variables, without
distinguishing the indirect channels through which the effects can take place. It is used to verify if
the data validates or not the stylized facts about the behavior of capital flows.
In the second, three controls are always included: income, size and openness. In this
way we can aisle the direct effect of the explanatory variable and avoid the possibility that it is
acting as a proxy of a more robust variable.46
The econometric results are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3.